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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 18-2991 
_____________ 
 
RITTENHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, INC.; THE MINES, INC.; G NET COMM. CO.; 
PHOENIX ESTATES; THOMAS J. GRECO, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE; THOMAS LEIGHTON, individually and as the Mayor of 
Wilkes-Barre; GERALD DESSOYE, individually and as Chief of Police of Wilkes-
Barre; J.J. MURPHY, individually and as City Administrator of Wilkes-Barre; TONY 
THOMAS, JR., individually and as members of the Wilkes-Barre City Council; KATHY 
KANE, individually and as members of the Wilkes-Barre City Council; WILLAM 
BARRETT, individually and as members of the Wilkes-Barre City Council; RICK 
CRONAUER, individually and as members of the Wilkes-Barre City Council; 
MICHAEL MERRITT, individually and as members of the Wilkes-Barre City Council; 
BUTCH FRATI, individually and as Director of Operations of Wilkes-Barre; LUZERNE 
COUNTY; MICHAEL SAVOKINAS, individually and as Luzerne County Sheriff; 
KING'S COLLEGE; FATHER THOMAS J. O'HARA, individually and as Officers and 
Employees of Kings College; ROBERT MCGONIGLE, individually and as Officers and 
Employees of Kings College; PAUL LIDENMUTH, individually and as Officers and 
Employees of Kings College; JOHN MCANDREW, individually and as Officers and 
Employees of Kings College 
 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(No. 3-11-cv-00617) 
District Judge A. Richard Caputo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 27, 2019 
 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.  
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(Filed: August 26, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Thomas Greco and his associated corporations1 (collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed 
suit alleging equal protection and due process violations for actions taken against his 
nightclub, The Mines.  The plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City, College, and County Defendants2 on all claims. The parties 
do not dispute that The Mines served a higher percentage of minorities than did 
neighboring bars.  Nor do they dispute that the neighborhood suffered from a high crime 
rate.  But the parties dispute whether the concentrated police presence around The Mines 
was due to a higher incidence of crimes in that area or the fact that The Mines served 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
1 The plaintiffs include G Net Comm. Co., Phoenix Estates, Thomas J. Greco, 
Rittenhouse Entertainment, Inc., and The Mines, Inc. 
2 The City Defendants include the City of Wilkes-Barre; Thomas Leighton, 
individually and as Mayor; Gerard Dessoye, individually and as Chief of Police; J.J. 
Murphy, individually and as City Administrator; Tony Thomas, Jr., Kathy Kane, William 
Barret, Rick Cronauer, and Michael Merritt, individually and as members of City 
Council; and Butch Frati, individually and as Director of Operations.  The College 
Defendants include King’s College; Father Thomas J. O’Hara, individually and as an 
Officer and Employee of King’s College; and Robert McGonigle, individually and as an 
Officer and Employee of King’s College.  The County Defendants include the County of 
Luzerne; Michael Savokinas, individually and as Luzerne County Sheriff. 
 
3 
 
more minorities.  Because there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to infer 
discriminatory intent, we will vacate and remand in part and affirm in part. 
I. 
The following background comes from the evidentiary record before the District 
Court, and on appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the facts are construed in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.3  Greco is the owner and operator of The 
Mines, a bar and nightclub in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.  King’s College, a private and 
Catholic college, is located across the street from The Mines. The Mines opened in 
September of 2008 and operated on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights, averaging 
between 400 and 800 customers each night.  About 30–40% of The Mines’ clientele were 
members of a racial minority, primarily black and Hispanic, and The Mines served more 
minorities than neighboring bars.  Chief of Police Gerald Dessoye testified that he did not 
know the racial composition of The Mines’ patrons but that the bars in Wilkes-Barre “are 
diverse,” Appendix (“App.”) 1597, and he told Greco, “you’ve got the wrong kind of 
crowd” at The Mines.  App. 3006.  Chad Williams, who lived above The Mines and 
sometimes worked there, encountered Father O’Hara, the president of the College, while 
                                              
3 The parties dispute whether the District Court abused its discretion in handling 
the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1.  The plaintiffs submitted their own 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts instead of responding to the moving parties’ 
statements.  The District Court applied the proper standard, “conduct[ing] a full analysis 
[of the record] to determine whether granting summary judgment was appropriate.”  
Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 2018).  The court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
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walking his dog.  Williams invited Father O’Hara to come inside The Mines, but Father 
O’Hara refused because the “crowd was too dark for [his] students.”  App. 5912. 
The Hardware Bar is located a few blocks from The Mines and served fewer 
minorities than The Mines.  Chief Dessoye described it as “a problem bar.”  App. 1586.  
Officer Donald Crane testified that the police allocated more resources toward the 
Hardware Bar than The Mines; “[w]e were definitely down at the Hardware Bar more 
often” responding to issues.  App. 1356.  In March 2009, Officer Erika Oswald was 
assaulted outside the Hardware Bar, leaving her unconscious from a traumatic head 
injury.  But Chief Dessoye did not increase police presence in front of the Hardware Bar 
thereafter. While the Hardware Bar addressed its issues by privately hiring Wilkes-Barre 
police officers to work security, Greco’s request to do the same was denied.   
The neighborhood around The Mines and the College suffered from a crime 
problem.  The police reported that on March 27, 2009, a fight broke out in front of The 
Mines involving about 200 people and overwhelming the police.  But Greco witnessed 
the fight and testified that only 50 people were involved.  When he told this to Chief 
Dessoye, the Chief responded, “sometimes they embellish the report” and maybe the 
report was “exaggerated.”  App. 3010, 3006.   
Crimes specifically against the College students included a stabbing, a fight 
resulting in a broken jaw, and an incident involving a gun and a knife.  Students and 
parents complained about campus safety and considered transferring due to safety 
concerns.  The College hosted a public forum to discuss campus safety issues.  Robert 
McGonigle, the Dean of Students, coordinated the event with the Wilkes-Barre police 
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department.  McGonigle sent an email to the students informing them of the campus 
safety forum; The Mines was mentioned twice in the email, while no other bar was 
mentioned.  The College prepared a document with anticipated questions, one of which 
was why the College had not closed down The Mines.  J.J. Murphy, the Wilkes-Barre 
city administrator, Father O’Hara, and Chief Dessoye were present at the forum.  Father 
O’Hara denied Greco’s request to attend.  On April 8, 2009, Father O’Hara, Mayor 
Leighton, and Chief Dessoye met to discuss how the issues in the area would be 
addressed.  Thereafter, Father O’Hara told Greco, “either we’re going to petition to close 
The Mines or the parents [of the College students] are going to petition to close The 
Mines.  And I’m going to talk to Mayor Tom and Chief Dessoye about how we’re going 
to continue to go about closing down The Mines.”  App. 3010.  A police officer in front 
of The Mines also told the manager “we are closing your boss down.”  App. 1156.   
On April 30, 2009, the Wilkes-Barre police department carried out a “saturation 
patrol” spanning a few blocks surrounding The Mines.  This type of police action 
“saturates” a specific neighborhood with law enforcement to address crime.  Multiple law 
enforcement entities participated in the saturation patrol at the request of the Wilkes-
Barre police department, including the Luzerne County Sherriff’s Office, Luzerne County 
Probation and Parole, State Parole and Probation, the Pennsylvania Liquor Control 
Board, and the Pennsylvania State Police Gang Unit.  Luzerne County Sheriff Savokinas 
had agreed to help other law enforcement entities when asked for assistance in the past, 
so when Chief Dessoye asked for County manpower for one night, the Sheriff agreed.  
Jennifer Roberts, a Deputy Sheriff in the Luzerne County Sheriff’s Office, participated in 
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the saturation patrol.  She testified that “[a]lmost all of” the Wilkes-Barre police officers 
told her that the purpose of the saturation patrol was to deal with The Mines.  App. 5287.  
Specifically, Deputy Sheriff Roberts testified that Officer Rennick, her personal friend, 
told her that The Mines is a “problem bar, and we don’t want these kind of people in our 
town.”  App. 5287.  She further testified that Officer Rennick was referring to “black 
people, Hispanic people.”  App. 5287.   
The concentrated police presence around The Mines did not begin and end with 
the saturation patrol on April 30.  Every Thursday, Friday, and Saturday night beginning 
in April 2009, the Wilkes-Barre police would park on the sidewalk in front of and across 
from The Mines; park in and block the entrance to The Mines’ parking lot; and stand at 
the entrance to The Mines with a drug-sniffing dog.  These actions deterred customers 
from entering The Mines.  Greco drove to the neighboring bars every Thursday, Friday, 
and Saturday to see if the police did the same elsewhere.  They did not.  Within months, 
The Mines went out of business.  
Meanwhile, some of Greco’s properties that had Keystone Opportunity Zone 
(“KOZ”) designation were then denied that designation on his application to extend.  
KOZ is a Pennsylvania state tax benefit program designed to encourage property owners 
to bring business to certain under-developed areas.  This is accomplished through local 
and state tax waivers, abatements, or exemptions.  Some of Greco’s properties in Wilkes-
Barre already had KOZ designation.  But around the same time The Mines was subject to 
significantly greater police presence, Greco’s application to extend the KOZ designation 
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of his properties was denied.  The parties disagree as to whether his application to extend 
was timely and contained the necessary information. 
In 2010, Greco pleaded guilty in federal court to the felony of misprision for 
failing to report corruption in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4.  Greco bought televisions for a 
county commissioner and failed to disclose the manner in which he was paid back.   
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the City, College, and County Defendants in 
2011 for violations of due process, equal protection, and various other statutory and state 
causes of action.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to shut down The 
Mines through concentrated police presence due to the fact that The Mines served more 
minorities than any neighboring bar.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the denial of KOZ 
renewal was a result of the discrimination, and that Greco’s charge and conviction for 
misprision was retaliation for threatening to sue.  The following counts survived the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss:  (1) plaintiffs’ §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against the City, 
County, and College Defendants, for the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection rights (Count One); (2) plaintiffs’ §§ 1981 and 1982 claims 
against Mayor Leighton, Chief Dessoye, the City of Wilkes-Barre, plaintiffs’ § 1985 
claims against all City Defendants,4 and plaintiffs’ §§ 1981, 1982, and 1985 claims 
against the College Defendants, for the alleged retaliation against plaintiffs for serving 
minorities (Count Two); (3) plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims 
                                              
4 While the Plaintiffs did not specify the subsection under which they are 
proceeding, the District Court assumed it was § 1985(3), as that is the only relevant 
subsection.  We will do the same.  
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against all defendants for alleged abuse of police powers (Count Three); (4) plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process claims against the City of Wilkes-Barre, Mayor Leighton, and 
City Council Members for the alleged improper denial of Greco’s KOZ applications 
(Count Four); (5) plaintiffs’ tortious interference with business relationships claim 
against the City and College Defendants (Count Five); and (6) plaintiffs’ claims against 
Mayor Leighton and Chief Dessoye for allegedly manipulating Greco into committing 
misprision (Count Six).  Rittenhouse Entm’t, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 3:11-617, 
2012 WL 3562030, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012).   
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on Counts One, 
Two, Three, Four and Six and dismissed Count Five.  The plaintiffs timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2010).  
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Buhdun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
765 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).   
III. 
We conclude that summary judgment was improper on Counts One, Two, and 
Three (“the discrimination claims”) against the City and College Defendants but that it 
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was proper on all claims against the County Defendants.  We also affirm on Counts Four 
and Six.  On remand, in addition to considering the discrimination claims, the District 
Court should also consider Count Five –– the state law tortious interference claim –– as 
well as the issue of qualified immunity for the City Defendants in the first instance. 
A. 
The discrimination claims raise distinct constitutional and statutory causes of 
action, but common among them is the element of intentional discrimination on the basis 
of race.  These claims include violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of §§ 1981, 1982, and conspiracy to 
commit them under § 1985.  To allege a racial discrimination claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege “racially discriminatory 
intent or purpose.”  City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 
U.S. 188, 195 (2003) (citation omitted).   Similarly, a claim for abuse of police power 
that violates substantive due process requires “conduct intended to injure” that “rise[s] to 
the conscience-shocking level.”  Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998).  
And “bias against an ethnic group” is “conscience-shocking behavior.”  Chainey v. 
Street, 523 F.3d 200, 220 (3d Cir. 2008).  So, use of the police power to discriminate 
intentionally on the basis of race violates substantive due process.  Likewise, an element 
of both §§ 1981 and 1982 is intentional racial discrimination.  Brown v. Phillip Morris 
Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001).  Section 1981 gives all persons the right to make 
and enforce contracts and § 1982 provides various real and personal property rights.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982.  Discriminatory intent requires that the decision-maker took “a 
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particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”  Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).   
The District Court granted summary judgment on these claims because it found no 
evidence of racially discriminatory intent.  We disagree.  There is evidence that the City 
Defendants concentrated the police presence around The Mines “at least in part ‘because 
of,’” Antonelli, 419 F.3d at 274, the race of The Mines’ clientele.  Specifically, the City 
Defendants’ statements –– “you’ve got the wrong kind of crowd” and “we don’t want 
these kind of people in our town,” referring to “black people, Hispanic people” –– give 
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.  App. 3006, 5287.  Moreover, there is 
evidence that only The Mines was singled out, while other bars, such as the Hardware 
Bar, that served fewer minorities but had plenty of incidents requiring police response, 
were not subject to similar treatment by police.  And while the City Defendants argue that 
such disparate treatment was warranted because of the March 27 event, the size of that 
fight is disputed.  The same is true of the College Defendants.  While they are not state 
actors, they are not immunized from liability because “a private party who willfully 
participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a constitutional 
right acts ‘under color of state law’ for purposes of [section] 1983.”  Abbot v. Latshaw, 
164 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir. 1998).  And there is evidence that the College Defendants 
conspired with the City Defendants to shut down The Mines because of the race of its 
patrons.  Father O’Hara’s statement that the crowd at The Mines was “too dark for [his] 
students” suggests discriminatory intent.  App. 5912.  Dean McGonigle’s email about the 
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student forum mentioned only one bar, The Mines, suggesting that he singled out The 
Mines from the neighboring, white-clientele bars.  And Father O’Hara’s statement that he 
was working with the mayor and the chief of police “about how we’re going to continue 
to go about closing down The Mines” suggests an agreement among the defendants.  
App. 3010.   
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 and § 1985 claims alleging violations of equal 
protection against the City and College Defendants should have survived summary 
judgment because a reasonable jury could infer that they agreed to deprive The Mines of 
equal protection of the law due to the race of The Mines’ patrons. This evidence of 
intentional racial discrimination concerned contract and property rights enumerated in § 
1981 and § 1982 –– such as the financial transaction of selling a drink at the plaintiffs’ 
bar –– so summary judgment on these claims for the City and College Defendants was 
improper.  Likewise, the substantive due process claims brought under § 1983 and § 1985 
for abuse of police power and conspiracy to abuse police power also survive summary 
judgment because a jury could reasonably infer that the City and College Defendants 
agreed to discriminate intentionally on the basis of race by deliberately concentrating 
police power on the bar that serves minorities, and in so doing, forcing the bar out of 
business and depriving the plaintiffs of their property.   
In contrast, the record is devoid of evidence that the County Defendants were 
involved at all beyond the assistance they offered the city on one night.  Sheriff 
Savokinas routinely agreed to help in multi-jurisdictional operations, and there is no 
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evidence he or his office acted with discriminatory intent.  Summary judgment in favor of 
the County Defendants on all claims was appropriate. 
B. 
In Count Four, the plaintiffs also allege a violation of substantive due process as a 
result of the City Defendants’ denial of KOZ extension benefits.  “To establish a 
substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is 
protected by the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of that 
protected interest shocks the conscience.”  Chainey, 523 F.3d at 219.  But not all property 
interests are “worthy” of substantive due process protection.  Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 
239, 244 (3d Cir. 1989).  And whether the property interest contains this “particular 
quality depends on whether that interest is fundamental under the United States 
Constitution.”  Newark Cab. Ass. v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(citation omitted).   
For example, we have held that state-law entitlement to water and sewer services 
is not protected by substantive due process.  Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 
1988).  There, we explained, 
[T]he legal fact that, once a municipality . . . establishes a 
utility for its citizens, a citizen’s expectation of receiving that 
service rises to the level of a property interest cognizable under 
the Due Process Clause, merely brings that expectation within 
the compass of the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural 
protections . . . .  It does not transform that expectation into a 
substantive guarantee against the state in any circumstance. 
 
Id. at 412 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).   We also held there is no property 
interest protected by substantive due process (or procedural due process) in 
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“Pennsylvania’s competitive bidding statutes [that] require that public contracts be 
awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.”  Indep. Enter. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & 
Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1178-80 (3d Cir. 1997).  Likewise, “tenured public 
employment is a wholly state-created contract right” so it is not a “fundamental property 
interest entitled to substantive due process protection.”  Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 
F.3d 133, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2000). The KOZ program provides tax benefits to certain 
businesses through an application –– and re-application –– process.  The KOZ benefits 
are merely that –– a benefit –– and therefore are not fundamental rights protected by 
substantive due process under the Constitution.  Therefore the “threshold requirement” 
for a substantive due process challenge is not met, Gikas v. Washington School Dist., 328 
F.3d 731, 737 (3d Cir. 2003), and summary judgment for the City Defendants was 
appropriate. 
C. 
Greco individually raises a claim of selective prosecution.  He claims that Mayor 
Leighton and Chief Dessoye “influenced” an FBI agent to “manipulate” Greco “into 
becoming vulnerable to the charge of misprision.”  Pl. Br. 40.  But the City of Wilkes-
Barre did not charge him with misprision; the federal government did.  Nor is there any 
evidence that Mayor Leighton and Chief Dessoye agreed to influence the FBI in any way.  
The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the City Defendants on this 
claim.  
IV. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s summary judgment 
order on Counts One, Two, and Three as to the City and College Defendants and 
remand.5  Summary judgment as to the County Defendants will be affirmed on all counts.  
Summary judgment on Counts Four and Six will be affirmed.6   
                                              
5 The City Defendants argue that summary judgment was proper on these counts 
for an alternative reason:  that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the disputed 
facts.  But the District Court did not reach this issue, so on remand the court should 
consider the qualified immunity of each City Defendant in the first instance.  See Grant v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1996).   
6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Count Five, a tortious interference claim under state law.  
Because we are vacating and remanding claims over which the District Court has original 
jurisdiction, we will also vacate the court’s order as to supplemental jurisdiction and 
remand.  
 
